Submitted by admin on Fri, 2005-11-04 09:00. ::
Based on Huxley's definition, I'm here to report to you that I had a very, very interesting weekend, which I spent with a group of some of Washington's leading policy intellectuals, AKA policy "wonks," in a Big Ideas retreat outside of the U.S. capital, where one of those wealthy foundations wined and dined us for three days in what could be described as a mini-Davos.
In return, we were expected to come up with new ideas on how to fix the universe or, more precisely, draw up the outline of a strategy that would permit the master of the universe, the United States, to stabilize Iraq, bring peace to the Middle East, re-energize the Western alliance, and accommodate the Chinese, among many other things.
ence the expectation among the conference's organizers that some of these Washington's Best and Brightest – I'm not including myself in that category – would have one of those eureka! moments and 72 hours of food, beer, and long debates into the early morning hours would produce – boom, gee whiz – the Big Idea in the form of, say, an exit strategy from Iraq or a new approach to dealing with Iran.
Well, don't hold your breath. The long weekend failed to generate either Big Ideas or even tiny ones. While I'm prohibited by the off-the-record ground rules from revealing the names of the conference's attendees or what exactly was said during that retreat in Virginia, I can convey to you my main and very depressing impression: American foreign policy in Iraq, the larger Middle East, and elsewhere is in a mess, and no one really knows how to get out of it.
But taking into consideration some of the comments and predictions I heard during the weekend, the idealists – that is, the neoconservative ideologues who hijacked U.S. foreign policy after 9/11 – have not lost their momentum.
The notion that the U.S. has the right and the obligation to promote American-style freedom and democracy not only in the Middle East but worldwide seems to be a dominant view among Washington's policy wonks. In fact, one of the panels during the conference was devoted to a discussion of how America could use its power to "democratize" Southeast Asia, including Singapore.
Even those Democrats participating in the event who have been critical of the neocons did not express opposition to the global democracy project itself. They just seemed to suggest that unlike the neocons, they would be able to achieve it at less cost, especially in military terms, for the U.S. Call it "neocon lite."
Interestingly enough, the harshest denunciations of the conduct of the Bushies' foreign policy and the neoconservative global democracy agenda one hears these days don't come from the direction of the Democratic Party but from Republican establishment figures who served in the administration of George the First.
Scowcroft said in the interview that he believed Paul Wolfowitz and other neocons "got a utopia out there." Democracy cannot be imposed by force, and not everyone values freedom above all, Scowcroft argued.
As a realist, Scowcroft expressed in the interview the necessity of considering the consequences of action, or "outcomes." For Scowcroft, "the second Gulf War is a reminder of the unwelcome consequences of radical intervention, especially when it is attempted without sufficient understanding of America's limitations or of the history of the region," concluded the New Yorker article.
But it's important to remember that one of the main reasons that Scowcroft feels comfortable expressing such views that run contrary to the policy paradigm dominating in Washington is that this elder statesman is not looking for a job in the administration, Congress, or the other centers of power in Washington.
Most of the policy intellectuals I met over the weekend are still relatively young and are marketing their ideas as part of a strategy to win professional benefits, and challenging the conventional wisdom on Iraq ("stay the course") and other issues wouldn't help advance that goal.
This is cache, read story here
